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Contents: [Introduction] | [The Expedition] | [Resolution] | [Notes]
One usually finds that a discussion of the present-day
boundaries that exist between Canada and the United States in the Pacific
Northwest begins with an historical overview of the events that led to the
delineation of territorial limits. In most cases, source material is drawn from
the documents printed within published accounts of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal
and the Fur Seal Arbitration. Unfortunately, a number of these materials are
extracts of longer documents and are, of course, chosen to support a particular
case in a boundary dispute. A great deal of material that can be used to explain
certain events that took place along the Pacific Coast in the nineteenth century
are located in the Records of the Russian-American Company1 and in the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) Archive.2 In an attempt to more fully explain the events which led
to the delineation of the American-Canadian boundary, this paper will use
materials drawn from these archives.
The Dryad Affair, or the Stikine Incident, is an event
that essentially determines where the boundaries between American and British
territory were to be drawn; and it illustrates the part played by the imperialism
of monopoly and by the relationship between the companies, aboriginal groups and
the British and Russian governments.
How does one categorize the Northwest Coast of North America
in the nineteenth century? Here we have a region that combines the
characteristics of informal and formal empire. The authority in British territory
was the commercial organization, the Hudson's Bay Company, a company with a trade
monopoly. Similarly, Russia possessed territory in this region and while this
possession combined aspects of formal and informal empire (the term implies the
military and economic predominance of a European presence which recognized and
co-operated with indigenous governments in Africa and the East3), the colony of Russian America could be perceived as
being slightly more a part of Russia's formal empire because of the nature of the
connection between government and colonial authority. The authority in this
colony was Russian and commercial; the Russian-American Company, a company which,
like the HBC, had a monopoly in trade. The examination of the history of this
coast, and of the two companies and their policies and activities indicates a
number of similarities in their experiences. How can one compare and contrast
these outposts of the British and Russian empires within the context of
“Imperialism,” or within the relationship between the metropole and the outpost?
The resolution of this problem lies in finding a definition
of “Imperialism” that allows for the territory under examination to be described
as being both part of a nation's informal as well as formal empire. This is best
achieved by examining the territory within the context of political rule devolved
to a monopolied commercial entity, or within the context of “Imperialism” as the
“imperialism of monopoly.” Imperialism of monopoly is territorial expansion by
a nation that is achieved through the efforts of a monopolied organization. The
monopoly is motivated to expand the territory under its control and thus its
operations for reasons of economic gain, but turns to its national government to
confirm the possession of this newly acquired territory and thus officially
expands the operational area of the monopoly. This official recognition of
territorial expansion was effected by the issuing of new charters, licences or
grants. Where the monopoly comes into contact with the frontier activities of
another monopoly, or with the frontier of a nation's sphere of influence, the
confirmation of a monopoly's, and thus its mother country's, possession of land
enters the diplomatic arena because the issue ceases to be one of defining a
region of trade activity, and becomes one of defining the spheres of influence
of nations and their territorial boundaries. For reasons of strategy and
politics, these territories were at times brought directly under a nation's
political control as colonies. This paradigm of expansion along the Northwest
Coast of North America allows one to see elements of both formal and informal
control by an empire, and allows for the comparison of these elements.4
The majority of the works that deal with the question of
imperialism, new imperialism5 or with viewpoints
that try to further the understanding of modern history within the context of
imperialism, are concerned primarily with Africa, India and the Far East, and to
a lesser degree, the countries of Latin and South America. Unfortunately, the
Northwest Coast of North America is generally ignored. The studies made of this
region deal with the fur trade, the sale of Alaska within the context of Russo-
American relations, the Oregon Treaty within the context of Anglo-American
relations and the Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast. Some of these works do not
achieve what they set out to do because they do not take into account the fact
that this coast was the arena in which the frontiers of three empires—British,
Russian and American—came into contact, resulting in both accommodation and
conflict.6 Of these three players, two were
monopolies while the other was a nation expanding into territory it saw as its
destiny to possess. The various permutations of the relationships that existed
between the three parties indicate the complexity in trying to explain the
history of the region.
The year 1821 marked the merger of the HBC and the North West
Company, and this union created a new and vital HBC whose territory stretched
from Hudson Bay to the Pacific. Like the RAC, the HBC was the sole representative
of its mother country's interests in that part of North America, and as such was
able to act as it pleased within the restrictions placed upon it by the
conditions of its various charters. As the sole representative of Britain on this
coast, the HBC played a dual role: it was involved in its own commercial
activities, but acted as an information gathering organization for the British
Government when required. This is illustrated in a private letter from the
Governor and Committee to George Simpson,7 2 June
1824, regarding the 1821 ukaz. Simpson was to provide information about
the region west of the Rocky Mountains in a form that could be forwarded to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, while a separate paper was to outline
details regarding the coast, the location of rivers north of the Columbia, and
the numbers and condition of aboriginal peoples living there.8 This duality in purpose in the correspondence of the
employees of the HBC on the Northwest Coast to the Governor and Committee and to
the Foreign Secretary—by way of the Governor and Committee—becomes more important
at the time of the Anglo-Russian negotiations regarding the Stikine Incident.
The HBC was primarily concerned with expanding its commercial
base by the establishment of a network of trading posts which could be used to
prove possession of territory and of a system of maritime trade that would
include the shipping of furs to Canton for sale, and by an attempt to supplant
the Russians in the trade in furs to the Chinese.9
The HBC maritime policy to dominate the trade in furs along the coast was
facilitated by hiring Lieutenant Aemilius Simpson10
to be the company's surveyor and hydrographer, to command any of the HBC vessels
and to be generally employed wherever his services could be useful.11 He was the Superintendent of the Marine Department for
the HBC on the Northwest Coast. The policy of establishing coastal posts required
that surveys be made of the coastline and its inhabitants to determine the most
favourable location for the construction of company establishments. In 1829,
Lieutenant Simpson visited the headquarters of the RAC at New Archangel where he
delivered a letter from George Simpson to Captain Peter Egorovich
Chistiakov,12 the Chief Manager. This communication
proposed an agreement between the two companies which would result in the removal
of the Americans from the coast, but Chistiakov refused because he lacked the
consent of the RAC directors. Aemilius Simpson discussed the HBC plans to
establish a post in the harbour of Nass with the Chief Manager, and George
Simpson believed that this post, in conjunction with the other coastal posts and
two vessels, would remove the Americans from the coast within five years.13
The Chief Manager of the Russian colonies told Aemilius
Simpson of the dangers that would face the enterprise “on account of the large
savage population in that quarterþtheir warlike habits and formidable means of
offense.”14 The HBC seemed to agree: it intended
to send a party of sixty to seventy men with the support of two vessels to
establish a post at “Nass harbour” in 1830.15 While
the HBC was aware of the hostile nature of the natives north of the Columbia
River,16 one has to wonder if the RAC Chief Manager
was not trying to prevent HBC expansion of trade by mentioning the threat posed
by the Indians inhabiting the coast. This assumption seems to be borne out by an
observation made of these Indians by Chief Trader Peter Skene Ogden.17 John McLoughlin,18 the
Chief Factor posted to Fort Vancouver on the Columbia River, informed the
directors of the HBC that“Mr. Ogden writes me that the Natives of Nass have so
far comported themselves as well as any Indians that he ever saw” and McLoughlin
added, “Yet these very Indians have been represented to us as the most
troublesome and hostile tribe to deal with on the Coast.”19
In 1829 the HBC Committee pressed McLoughlin to establish a
post at or near the “Port of Nass” in the summer of 1830 without delay. The
expedition that was to effect this plan was to number no less than fifty men
under the command of Ogden because of his “enterprising character and active
habits,” which were displayed in his efforts in the Snake Country.20 In March 1830, Aemilius Simpson was sent to Nass to
search for a suitable location upon which a trading establishment could be
constructed. He arrived at the Nass on 28 August and found a suitable location
for the planned post seven or eight miles upstream where a vessel could lie at
anchor “within Pistol shot of the shore."21 He
tried to obtain information from the Indians there concerning the details of the
river and the country upstream, but it was not provided. Aemilius Simpson noted
that these natives enjoyed a monopoly of trade with those native groups located
upstream and did not wish to lose their middleman position by describing the land
to the interior.22 Simpson traded with the local
Indians, the Nishga, and spoke with one Native who came from farther upriver. The
information he provided indicated that this river had its source in New Caledonia
and was probably the Babine or Simpson River if not the one falling into Port
Essington.23 This expedition left Nass on 3
September and returned to Fort Vancouver, where the majority of the population,
including Ogden, was ill with malaria. This state of affairs delayed the
expedition to construct the Nass post until the spring of the following
year.24
The reticence of the Indians to provide Simpson with
information regarding the topography or trade of the interior is a common
occurrence within the context of the fur trade. The Indians in direct contact
with the “White” trader were able to obtain desired trade goods with the furs
they obtained from Indian groups removed from this area of direct contact. There
were established trade routes from the coast to the interior and the coastal
Indians were very protective of these routes. The HBC wanted to remove the
Americans and the Russians from the competition for the trade of the coast, and
facilitate their own trade using a network of posts that were linked by a
transportation system using steam or sailing vessels. At this time, the HBC
restricted itself to establishing posts on or very near the coast at the mouths
of rivers. When it began its policy of constructing posts inland of the Russian
lisière (a coastal strip), it began to encroach on a sphere of influence that
was, in effect, two-tiered: the area encompassed by Russian trade and that of the
coastal Indians.
One can apply the model of imperialism of monopoly to
explain the actions of the British and Russian companies. The chief manager of
Russian America did not have the resources, personnel and material to expand and
consolidate Russia's holdings in North America so his intent was to preserve the
status quo. After learning, from Lieutenant Simpson, of the HBC's plan to
establish posts along the coast and inland, he realized that the British traders
would acquire furs that would normally have made their way into Russian hands
through the Native trade network. He tried to dissuade the British from taking
this action by implying that the expense in setting up such a network of posts
would be expensive because of the hostile nature of the natives living in the
region. Here, Chistiakov is using an economic argument in an attempt to prevent
future British encroachment on Russian trade and thus Russian territory.
In 1831, Aemilius Simpson was ordered to transport Ogden and
his party to Nass in the Dryad and the Vancouver, and to supply any
required assistance. He was then to proceed to the coast to trade while adhering
to the articles of the Anglo-Russian Treaty. He was to trade as little liquor,
arms and ammunition as was possible to the Indians—even within British
territory—as was to examine the Stikine to determine if, as reported, a large
river fell into the ocean there.25 In the autumn
of that year, Captain Simpson died as a result of an illness, and Ogden replaced
him as the superintendent of shipping on the Northwest Coast. Ogden's
instructions from McLoughlin ordered him to avail himself of every opportunity
to cultivate a friendly relationship with the RAC, and to “examine Stikine River
and endeavour to ascertain if there is a situation Eligible to erect and
Establishment on its Banks about thirty miles from the ocean and also at Port
Essington."26 He was to go to Sitka if it was
convenient and provide the Russians with goods at cost if asked and if he could
do so without injuring his own trade. If he was criticized for trading arms,
ammunition and liquor to the Indians, he was to indicated that the HBC was averse
to the practise, but was forced to do so because American traders traded these
items to the coastal Indians.
In the 1820s the HBC was concerned with plans to establish
a system of trade along the coast which would connect with the interior trade and
remove American and Russian competition. In the 1830s, the HBC was turning more
to establishing an alliance of sorts with the RAC to oust the Americans from the
trade along the coast while damaging the Russian trade by constructing posts in
British territory close to the Russian lisière. It was for this reason that
Simpson and Ogden were sent to investigate various rivers flowing into the
Pacific for their suitability as transportation routes into the interior.
Ogden was not able to follow McLoughlin's instructions and
examine the Stikine River until 1833,27 and it was
his opinion that it would not suit the plans of the HBC.28 The Governor and Committee of the HBC were pressing
McLoughlin to “establish one or two more posts on the Coast say at Stikine or
Port Stevens, or at both those places. . . as we consider such Establishments
highly important to our views in regard to the Coasting Trade."29 Their view was that posts located on the Stikine River
(at latitude 56º 40'), at Siqually in the Cowlitz Portage on Puget Sound
(latitude 47º 30') and at Millbank Sound (latitude 52º), in conjunction with two
vessels that would be used in the coastal fur trade but would be used in the off
season to ship timber, salmon and other goods to the Sandwich Islands, and a
steam vessel that the company planned to send to the coast, would remove the
American traders from this coast.30 This
correspondence indicates that a post on the Stikine was integral to the coastal-
trading policy of the HBC, and Ogden was ordered to establish such a post.
The RAC policies with regard to the Stikine River were
reactionary in that action was taken to frustrate the ambitions of the HBC rather
than to effect some aspect of its own commercial plans. The ambitions of the HBC
were made clear to the Governor of Russian America, Chistiakov, during his
conversations with Aemilius Simpson and Ogden when they visited Sitka. Lieutenant
Simpson visited Sitka in 1829 and delivered George Simpson's letter to the
Governor. This letter stated that Aemilius Simpson was to survey the harbour of
Nass where the HBC would form an establishment to trade with the natives there
the following year. The letter and other correspondence from the HBC to
Chistiakov and to the directors of the RAC was forwarded by the latter to the
Russian government.31 These letters suggested a
commercial agreement between the companies which could be used to remove the
American traders from the Pacific Coast. The RAC directors were of the opinion
that the presence of American traders on the coast led to a decline in the furs
obtained by the RAC and, therefore, to financial loss. They asked the governor,
Baron Ferdinand Petrovich Vrangel',32 to restrict
the company's trade with the Americans.33 The RAC
was also concerned with the activities of the HBC; it could not remain a passive
witness to the activities of the English in Russian territory in the trade with
the Kolosh, the Russian term for the Tlingit Indians, but had to take measures
to restrict this trade. This required a sufficient stock of goods in Russian
America to be used in the Kolosh trade, but it would be difficult to compete with
the English because the trade goods brought around the world be way of Siberia
were at least twice as expensive as those obtained directly from England by the
HBC.34 The HBC was a greater threat to the RAC than
the Americans because of the resources it could bring to bear on and its interest
in the coast. The HBC, in trying to gain the RAC as a ally against the American
traders, laid out its plans for the coast before Vrangel' who could then use this
information to take action to frustrate them.
On 26 April 1832 (OS),35 Peter
Skene Ogden arrived at Sitka on the schooner Cadboro to discuss with
Vrangel' the possibility of the HBC replacing the Americans as the supplier of
the colony's goods. As a result of the conversations between himself and Ogden,
Vrangel' learned of the future intentions of the British company. He knew that
the HBC planned to establish a post on the Stikine and sent the brig
Chichagov, under the command of Lieutenant Zarembo, with instructions to
construct a fort there.36 Vrangel' was also
informed that the HBC planned to establish posts at Port Essington and on the
Queen Charlotte Islands, and Ogden repeated the HBC proposal to supply Russian
America in return for river beaver pelts. This offer was refused by Vrangel'. If
the HBC wanted the RAC to join it in its efforts to oust the Americans from the
coast, Vrangel' believed the HBC should supply the Russians with goods at prices
favourable to the RAC so the latter could dispense with their American
suppliers.37
Vrangel' was concerned with making the Russian-American
colonies self-sufficient, as well as with trying to consolidate Russia's hold on
the coast, but was frustrated by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1825. The Chief
Manager was aware of what the effects on Russia's trade with the Indians of, and
Russian's claims to, the Pacific Coast would be if the British were allowed to
establish trading posts upstream of Russia's territorial boundaries: he had seen
Russia's influence and trade decline at Nass. For these reasons he petitioned the
Directors of the RAC to take action to rescind the clause permitting free
navigation of rivers and streams in Russian territory by the British but did not
think such a restriction would be acceptable. He suggested that free navigation
from British territory through Russian territory be allowed but that free
navigation upstream into British territory be forbidden. He informed the
directors: “I from my side, until receiving instruction, will hold the English
by force if they decide to sail up the river Stikine.”38
After Ogden's visit to Sitka, Vrangel' sent two reports to
the directors of the RAC commenting on Russia's trade along the coast in relation
to that of the British and the Americans. In the first, Vrangel' stated that the
HBC was paying the Tlingit, the Indian group which inhabited the Stikine
Territory, two to three times the price for furs than that offered by American
traders in an effort to remove the latter from the trade, and mentioned Ogden's
invitation to the RAC to join the HBC in trying to effect this goal.39 In the second, Vrangel' described the success of the HBC
trade at Nass; he mentioned that the HBC had planned to establish a post in
British territory alongside the Stikine River, but that the death of Aemilius
Simpson had postponed such action, and stated that an HBC post on the Stikine
would destroy Russian trade with the Tlingit if the latter company was not to
command the trade of the Pacific Coast from Cross Sound or points farther north,
to the south as far as California. He did not want the RAC to be a passive
witness to English actions, rather to take measures against them, but was unable
to broaden the trade of the RAC with the then “shortage of goods and stinginess
in pay” to the Kolosh (Tlingit).40
In 1833 Vrangel', motivated by the need to enter the trade
with the Tlingit at a competitive level, sent the brig Chichagov under the
command of Captain Adolf Karlovich Etholen,41 to
the straits inhabited by that Indian group and located in Russian
territory.42 Vrangel' arranged for the
Chichagov to accompany one of the HBC ships on the latter's trading
expedition to obtain an idea of how and where trade with the Tlingit was carried
on. The principal task of this first visit to the straits was to gather detailed
information concerning the prices by which the trade was conducted, and the place
where the trade was carried out. In the instructions sent to Etholen, Vrangel'
stated that during the months of March and April, when the coastal trade took
place, the Chichagov shadow the HBC shop, but in the latter part of May,
when the HBC ships would leave the area, Etholen should travel to the Stikine
area to determine where and when furs could be acquired from the Tlingit, and
what goods and prices would be necessary to acquire those furs. Etholen was to
remain on good terms with the HBC and not compete with it, and was to tell the
HBC that the RAC was ready to co-operate with the English to push the Americans
from the straits. The goal was for the English ship to act as a leader for
acquainting the RAC with the course of business in that region.43
Vrangel''s report to the RAC directors, dated 1 May 1833
(OS), stated the Chichagov's voyage had a number of objectives: to
familiarize the RAC with the places and means of trade in the straits lying
within Russia's borders; to engage in trade actively to complicate that of the
Americans and to see that the Conventions of 1824 and 1825 were adhered to by
foreigners; to declare to American skippers that the term of free trade for them
in the straits would expire in 1834 and in 1835 for the British, and to inform
them that the RAC would not tolerate violations of the Conventions. He stated
that the company had not visited this area before because it would suffer a
commercial loss since it would not trade in goods prohibited by the Convention.
The company was not able to prevent foreigners trading these goods since it could
not hold them at the borders of Russian America.44
Vrangel' did not favour a renewal of the Conventions since
he wanted competition with the British and Americans to end; he was of the
opinion that British and American traders had destabilized the region by trading
arms, ammunition and liquor to the native peoples inhabiting Russian territory.
It would be possible to remove the American traders through competition in the
fur trade, especially with the assistance of the HBC, but the British would not
be as easy to oust.
When Etholen returned from the Stikine he informed Vrangel'
that the Tlingit there had invited the HBC to settle at the river's mouth.
Vrangel' took action to forestall such an occurrence. On 12 June 1833 he
instructed Fleet Lieutenant Zarembo, the commander of the brig Chichagov,
to sail to the mouth of the Stikine where he was to construct a Russian
establishment. Zarembo was to winter there with a threefold purpose: to engage
in the fur trade, to prevent the HBC from executing their plans for the Stikine
trade, and to cut the timber needed to construct a redoubt. Vrangel' cautioned
Zarembo to take steps to ensure that hostilities with the Tlingit be avoided, and
the additional instructions he sent to Zarembo on 27 August 1833 stated the
latter should provide the toens, or chiefs, there with gifts to gain their
support in order to prevent their impeding the construction of the establishment.
Lieutenant Zarembo was not to inform the Kolosh of his intention to construct a
post but work on the assumption that the Indians would ask him to remain there.
He would then agree and build the post. Zarembo was told to concentrated his
efforts on gaining the support of the toens Kek-khal'-tsel and his brother
Zhkhya-ti-sti since the former “has a much better disposition towards us that
Seiks, who is tied more to the English.”45 It was
hoped that the favourable disposition of two of the three brothers towards the
RAC would facilitate the establishment of Russia's presence at the mouth of the
Stikine while hindering that of Britain.
The Russians assumed that the HBC would come to the mouth
of the Stikine to trade and Zarembo was to prevent such as occurrence by
referring to Article Two46 of the Anglo-Russian
Convention and by telling the captain t\of the British vessel to leave Russian
territory. He was to raise the RAC flag over the establishment that was to be
constructed and the chief of the Kolosh was to be presented with a medal that was
inscribed “Ally of Russia.”47 Even though the
Russians at Stikine were to remain on friendly terms with the natives, the
expedition was always to be in a state of readiness to repulse an attack.48
Regardless of the information and opinions sent to the RAC
directors by Vrangel', the directors were opposed to competition with the HBC in
the coastal trade. They wanted the new establishment at Stikine to be made safe
first before any thought was given to trade. Vrangel' noted that his was not the
policy followed by the British and if the directors' plan was to be brought to
effect, the Kolosh would suspect the activities of the RAC.49 The establishment of a post that was not trade-oriented
would necessarily raise suspicion, while a trading establishment would be readily
accepted: “to settle among them, strengthen our position and not trade with
them is the surest means to array them against us from the first step and such
a mistake would be very hard to correct.”50
Vrangel' had written to the RAC directors stating his views
on how British and American traders were to be dealt with in Russian territory
and on the renewal of the Conventions of 1824 and 1825, and asked them if the RAC
should compete with the HBC in the straits. The instructions he received were
contradictory: he was told to adhere to the letter of the Conventions and to
contravene them.51 Thus it is understandable that
Vrangel' would find it easier to act as he saw fit in order to improve Russia's
position in North America until he received instructions to do otherwise. In 1834
Vrangel' appointed Sergei Miskvitinov commander of the establishment constructed
at the mouth of the Stikine, and named the post Sv. Dionisiya (St. Dionysius).
Fleet Lieutenant Zarembo was to station the brig Chichagov near the post
and was to be in command of the Russians there. The Chief Manager instructed
Zarembo to frustrate any British attempt to establish a post on the Stikine by
refusing them entry into the river's mouth.52 The
post was nearing completion in June of 1834.
In December of 1833 the HBC had on the Northwest Coast seven vessels ,of which five were to be used in the coastal trade. As John McLoughlin
was informed by the governor and committee: “We are anxious to prosecute this
branch of the business with vigour, and as you will now have five Vessels, say
either the Nereide, Dryade or Ganymede, the Eagle, the Lama, Cadboro and
Vancouver to act in concert with the Establishments.”53 In the spring of 1834 the plans of the HBC on the coast
were clear. Ogden was placed in charge of the HBC expedition that was to
establish a post at least thirty miles upstream on the Stikine River, and he was
to take the men required for this task from Forts McLoughlin and Simpson. The
Vancouver54 was to examine “the Coast
between Mount St Elice [sic] and Stikine to endeavour to discover if there
is any River in that space of Country sufficiently large to enable us to form
Establishments in the Interior and to where the Copper Mine is.” Ogden was
further instructed that “If the Russians are established at Point Highfield you
will be required by the Russians Tariff in your dealings with the Indians and if
they give no Rum to the Indians you will also forbear to give them any."55 In short, the trade was to be directed by Russian
practices to preserve good relations with the latter.
At Fort Vancouver, Ogden and a contingent of men embarked
on the Company brig Dryad, with a crew of seventeen56 under the command of Charles Kipling, and from there
sailed to Nass where the remainder of the expedition was waiting. The complete
party of sixty-four servants and eight officers57
then set sail for the river Stikine and on 18 June the Dryad came within
sight of the Russian establishment which had been built at Point Highfield.
A “whale boat” with a swivel or blunderbuss on the bow and
manned by four men came alongside the Dryad, and the man in charge
presented Ogden with a number of written questions that were to be
answered.58 There then began the presentation of
a series of written declarations from Vrangel', Zarembo and Sergei Moskvitinov
telling Ogden that the Dryad had no legal right to travel up the Stikine
and that the British expedition should remove itself from Russian territory. A
further two visits from the Russians indicated to Ogden that communication would
be difficult since the Russians did not have a knowledge of English, French,
Latin or Spanish. A baidarka (a kayak with open hatches for one, two or
three persons) was sent to Sitka by the Russians to inform the governor of the
Dryad's arrival. On 19 June Dr. William Fraser Tolmie59 and Captain Duncan visited Lieutenant Zarembo on the
Chichagov, formerly the Tally Ho!,60
which was armed with twelve cannon and four swivel guns. Again, they were
informed the Dryad could neither in the sound or proceed up the river.
Baidarkas sent to Sitka on 18 and 19 June carried Ogden's complaints to
the governor.61
Etholen, the acting governor in Sitka, informed Zarembo that
his letter of 8/20 June had been received and reiterated Vrangel''s instruction
to prevent the British from travelling upstream. Zarembo was to do this using the
terms outlined in Article Two of the Convention of 1825 and Etholen stressed that
Zarembo adhere to the terms of Article Eleven62 not
to resort to force. He added that he was sending the translator Dal'strem, the
only interpreter at Sitka, who had some knowledge of English, and that he would
send the Chilkat, with the translator Gideon aboard, to the Stikine to aid
Zarembo in his communications with both the British and the Kolosh.63
Two chiefs of the Stikine Indians, Seiks and Anacago, came
on board the Dryad and informed Ogden that the British could establish a
trading post at the mouth of the river without opposition from them.64 These Indians were aware that the two posts competing
for their furs would result in their receiving higher prices, but would oppose
any movement to establish a post further upstream since the fur trade would
bypass them. Tolmie stated Seiks “had undoubtably been egged up to this line of
conduct by our opponents the Russians, who have not failed to point out to him
the danger of our intercepting his supply of furs from the interior
tribes."65 The Tlingit traded with the interior
tribes and sold the furs acquired to traders plying the coast. If the trade moved
inland they realized they would lose their position of middleman and be reduced
to one of poverty, having to trade with tribes in the interior to obtain desired
European trade goods.
On 29 June, Ogden visited Zarembo and was handed a written
reply to his complaints from Etholen. This letter stated that Vrangel' was absent
from Sitka and would not be returning until the end of August and that, as a
result, permission for the British to proceed up the Stikine would not be
forthcoming. However, he could meet with Vrangel' at Sitka at a later date to
discuss the matter.66 Zarembo informed Ogden
that any attempt to ascend the river would be opposed by force. On
his return [to the Dryad], he asked the opinion of each gentlemen & we all
agreed with him in thinking that opposed as we are by both the Russians and
Natives it would be highly imprudent to persist in the undertaking.67
Ogden was legally entitled to travel up the Stikine by
Article VI of the 1825 Anglo-Russian Convention, but was intimidated from doing
so by the opposition presented by the Indians and the Russians. The Russians had
the brig Chichagov stationed at the mouth of the river. She was a
formidable ship with a crew of eighty-four men and sixteen guns,68 more than double the complement and armament on board
the Dryad. Rather than fight an Indian-Russian alliance, Ogden decided to
leave the mouth of the Stikine, promising Zarembo that he would speak to Vrangel'
in Sitka at the end of August.
On 27 September the Dryad arrived at Sitka. Ogden
tried to reason with the Russian Chief Manager regarding the rights allowed him
by the Convention of 1825 and how the articles of that agreement were violated
by Zarembo, but met with no success. Vrangel' continued to support the actions
taken by the commander of the Chichagov and based his claims of their
legality on Article II of the same convention. At Sitka, Ogden received a letter
from Vrangel' dated 19 September/1 October 1834 which stated the latter's belief
that the Stikine was not suitable for navigation, that no HBC establishment
existed in British territory alongside the river and that “The true aim of your
projected establishment 10 marine leagues up the course of the Stikine, is none
other, than to harm our trade."69 On 7 October
Ogden left Sitka with the Dryad expedition after failing in every attempt
to complete his assignment.
Chief Factor McLoughlin learned of the Dryad's being
prevented from travelling up the Stikine when Ogden returned with the vessel to
Fort Vancouver. He then informed the Government and Committee of the HBC in
London of the events that had occurred and enclosed a statement of the losses he
believed the company would incur as a result, £22,150 10s.70 On 24 October 1835, J. H. Pelly71 informed the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount
Palmerston,72 of the violation of several articles
of the 1825 Convention, and asked to meet with him in order to discuss the means
to obtain redress from the Russians. The Russians were believed to have violated
a formal agreement between themselves and England, and since every attempt to
settle the problem of the Dryad Affair at the company level had failed,
the HBC decided to press their claims at a diplomatic level.
The claims of the Company became a diplomatic issue when
Palmerston informed Britain's ambassador in St. Petersburg, Lord Durham:73
Your E[xcellency] is therefor instructed to bring the Subject
without delay before the Russian Cabinet, to claim Redress and Compensation for
the British Subjects who have been therefore aggrieved, and to express the
Confident Expectation of H. M. Govt. that such orders will be given to the
Russian Authorities on the Coast, as may prevent the recurrence of similar
violations of the Treaty.74
When Durham raised the matter with Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, the
latter state that he had no official information regarding the incident but
stated that he would look into the matter immediately. After making enquiries
Nesselrode came to the conclusion that the Russians had violated the Treaty of
1825, but that the financial claims of the HBC were unjustified. The latter was
based on the fact “that there were no forcible measures taken against Captain
Ogden.”75 If Ogden failed to proceed up the Stikine
when no threat of force was forthcoming from the Russians, it was his fault alone
that the expedition did not attain its objective. Since Ogden was at fault, in
Nesselrode's estimation, any losses incurred by the HBC were his liability and
not the Russians'.
The diplomatic settlement of the British claims resulting
from the Dryad Affair was not forthcoming because of the problem
experienced in trying to determine whether or not the Russians threatened the
Dryad expedition with force. The Russian brig stationed at the mouth of
the Stikine and the fort there implied a threat of violence which, even though
not realized, was successful in deterring the Dryad from travelling up the
river. In the words of George B. Roberts, one of the members of the Stikine
expedition: “The Russians bluffed us off they had a brig the Tally Ho!
purchased from the Americans. . . .”76 Ogden might
have tried sailing upstream past the Russians but to try to attempt to bypass the
Indians would have been a different matter. He was unsure as to whether the
Russians would resort to force but the Indian tribes assured him they would. The
latter threat was actual, not probable, and was the determining factor of the
two. The documents sent to Palmerston to substantiate the case of the HBC were
extracts taken from the accounts written by individuals who had been present on
the Dryad during the incident.77 These
edited excerpt were chosen without mentioning the mitigating circumstances such
as Indian opposition and the difficulty of communication. In their dealings at
the mouth of the Stikine, the British and the Russians communicated in languages
in which both parties were not fluent, and this may have resulted in one
misunderstanding the intentions of the other. This edited document sent to the
Foreign Office is an indication of how the HBC controlled the information sent
to the British government to suit its own goals. If the more important factor of
Indian hostility had been made known, the justification for the case for losses
brought against the RAC may have been removed, or it may have resulted in the
British government calling for a reduction in the amount of monies claimed.
There were a number of factors which complicated t he
discussions concerning the HBC claims. Pelly and Simpson arrived in St.
Petersburg 27 August 1838 with the intention of resolving the HBC claims by
meeting with the Directors of the RAC. They soon learned any such negotiation
would be fruitless because “the Board of Directors had little power and would not
determine any important measure with international ramifications without the
sanction of Count Nesselrode.”78 The Russian
company was under the aegis of the Minister of Finance and any communication that
took place between the government and the company was the responsibility of Baron
Vrangel'. Pelly and Simpson found that they were unable to negotiate on an
international level since the issue had entered the realm of international law
and diplomacy. The persons that Pelly and Simpson should have dealt with were
occupied with the Americans, who were trying to negotiate a renewal of their 1824
Convention with Russia.79
On 9 December 1838 (O.S.) Nesselrode wrote to Count Kankrin,
the Minister of Finance, regarding the negotiations between Britain and Russian
concerning the claims of the HBC resulting from the Dryad Affair. He
stated that the Tsar
was pleased to admit that it would be more in accord with the rules
of strict justice to admit the principles on which the claim is based and to
enter into negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company in regard to the amount of
the indemnification claimed by the Company rather than continue a dispute, which
we shall be obliged ultimately to give in to. . . . I take it upon myself to ask
Your Excellency to consider whether it might not be advisable for the Russian-
American Company to enter into friendly negotiations with the Hudson's Bay
Company, looking towards such a settlement.80
This desire was being realized by Simpson and Vrangel' who had been in
correspondence concerning a possible means of settling the disagreement between
the HBC and RAC. They were in agreement on many of the proposed terms that would
comprise the legal resolution of the Dryad Affair, but Simpson proposed
they meet in Berlin on the last day of 1838 to discuss some of the details, both
armed with the authority to negotiate and sign binding agreements for their
respective companies. Count Nesselrode sent a report to Nicholas I asking that
Vrangel' be permitted to meet with Simpson in Berlin. This report mentioned the
proposed terms of the agreement which were forwarded to Nesselrode from the
Directors of the RAC by the Minister of Finance.
The issue moved from the arena of international law and
diplomacy to the company level when it was realized that Russia would have to
admit a contravention of the Convention of 1825 by its subjects. Rather than
continue discussions at the inter-governmental level, it was decided that the
companies try to negotiate what indemnities were to be paid. While the Convention
had been contravened, the true issue—in the Russian government's interpretation—was not territorial but dealt with the losses suffered by a company involved in
a commercial enterprise. In fact, the underlying motivation for the Dryad
expedition was both commercial and territorial because the HBC planned to gain
economic control of a region which would lead to the removal of the Russian
presence from North America because of the losses suffered by the RAC in the fur
trade, and the HBC would then acquire Russian America. Russian America would then
become a British possession.
Vrangel' and Simpson were unable to meet in Berlin so they
met in Hamburg some days later and it was there that they signed an agreement on
27 January/6 February 1839. Article One of the agreement allowed the HBC to lease
the lisière, excluding the islands, between Cross Sound and latitude 54ø 40' for
a ten-year period beginning 1 June 1840 for the annual rent of 2,000 seasoned
land otter skins. The provisioning of the Russian-American colonies by the HBC
was mentioned in another article: in 1840 2,000 fenagos (1 fenago=126 pounds) of
wheat were to be supplied and after that initial year, 4,000 fenagos were to be
delivered yearly at a rate of 10s. and 9d. per fenago.81
One of the factors which had a bearing on the Dryad
Affair and its outcome was the relationship that existed between the RAC and the
Russian Government. The Company was essentially in control of its own economic
affairs but political matters came under the purview of the Russian government.
Once Vrangel' had arranged for the Dryad to be prevented from sailing up
the river, which violated the convention of 1825, the Company's actions developed
political ramifications. The HBC turned to the British Government to present its
case to the Russian Government to obtain redress for the RAC preventing Ogden
from completing his mission. The factors which complicated these discussions were
that the Law Officers of the Crown did not consider the documents forwarded to
them by the HBC to be suitable to present as evidence before the representatives
of the Russian Government,82 and that it was not
clear whether the Russians at Stikine had threatened the Dryad with
violence. Russia's government considered the possibility of an agreement being
reached between the HBC and the RAC when it was made apparent that Britain would
not cease pressing for the resolution of the HBC.
Russia saw three reasons justifying such an agreement: the
accord would prevent “unwilling rivalry and unavoidable clashes” between the HBC
and the RAC which would result from their attempts to dominate the interior
trade; the lease would remove any need for the RAC to pay 135,000 rubles to the
HBC; and the lease would prevent—in the opinion of Nesselrode—any clashes with
Americans since it would end the latter's attempts to renew the fourth article
of the 1824 Convention.83 When Simpson and Vrangel'
met in Hamburg to sign the agreement, Simpson was answerable only to the Governor
and Committee of the HBC, while Vrangel' was answerable to the Tsar. As a result,
the agreement can be seen as an accord entered into by a British company and the
Russian Government. The HBC did not notify the British Foreign Office of its
progress in reaching an agreement, and the ambassador to Russia continued to
present the Company's case in St. Petersburg until he was notified by the Russian
Foreign Minister, Nesselrode, that further discussions were unnecessary since the
desired agreement was about to be signed.
The 1839 agreement was particularly advantageous to the
Russians: the RAC obtained a reliable supply of provisions which later enabled
it to sell Ross and its Californian possessions, which were running at a loss,
to Sutter. This streamlining of Russia's North American possessions was believed
to have created a condition which would allow the Company to govern, and trade
within, its remaining possessions more effectively and profitably.
The agreement favoured the RAC in yet another way. If
Zarembo had not prevented the Dryad from travelling up the Stikine, the
HBC would have established a post in British territory which would have obtained
the furs which were being traded to the RAC. The directors of the RAC had
informed the Minister of Finance that all the furs that found their way into
Russian hands in the area of the Stikine originated in British territory and came
to the RAC through trade between Indian groups. Therefore, if the Dryad
had been allowed to pass St. Dionysius, the RAC would have lost the income from
the trade in furs. Fortunately for the Russians, the Dryad was stopped,
an agreement was signed and the RAC was freed of the indemnity claimed by the
HBC. Russia retained possession of the Stikine Territory and the RAC obtained
2,000 furs, the equivalent of approximately 118,000 rubles, from the HBC
annually.
From the standpoint of the British Government the agreement
was efficacious diplomatically. In any commercial or political dispute between
Russia and Britain it was hoped the Americans would ally themselves with the
former. Russia no longer had to fear that country's territorial ambitions since
the Americans had no legal right to visit her possessions for reasons of trade,
or any other. Thus, her territorial integrity was maintained while any potential
for causing diplomatic ill-feeling between herself and the other two countries
concerning her possessions in North America was removed. The amicable settlement
resulted in Russia's relations with Britain, her former and potential opponent
in European affairs, being more favourable, at least within the context of North
America.
The agreement was also highly advantageous to the HBC. The
Company acquired control of, while acknowledging Russian sovereignty over, the
lisière separating its territories from the Pacific and believed it would,
through its trade with the Indian tribes there, gain full possession of the
Russian territories in North America. It replaced the Americans as the
provisioners of the Russian colonies and, in so doing, removed the Americans from
the coastal trade. The RAC remained as the HBC's only rival and the latter did
not think the former would survive its competition for long.
In 1834, the HBC vessel Dryad tried to sail up the
Stikine River to establish a post in British territory that would drain that
region of furs, lower the profits of the RAC and thus assist in the removal of
the latter from the trade with the Indians along the Northwest Coast. Peter Skene
Ogden, the leader of the HBC expedition, had informed Vrangel' the chief-manager
of Russian America, of the HBC's plans in 1832 when he visited Sitka, and
Vrangel' realizing that the British voyage was directed at destroying Russian
trade and thus Russian tenure of land in North America, took action to prevent
the Dryad from travelling up the river. This action constituted a
contravention of Article VI of the 1825 Convention—the article that dealt with
free navigation of rivers—but Vrangel' was aware this action was necessary if
Russian land was not to be lost. Vrangel' realized that the Russian monopoly was
unable to deal with British competition and thus the trade and control of that
region was threatened. He decided to deal with this threat by interpreting the
articles of the convention to suit Russian needs.
Discussions at the inter-company, or inter-monopoly, level
were unsuccessful so the HBC approached the British Government to obtain redress.
The British government then brought the matter to an international level since
it was concerned with the financial losses and loss of access to markets suffered
by British subjects due to the contravention of an international agreement. The
issue then was dealt with by the British ambassador to St. Petersburg and the
Russian minister responsible for foreign affairs. The two monopolies were asked
to provide the relevant information that would allow the governments to discuss
the matter, and the HBC manipulated the data it provided to remove pertinent
factors the mitigated the action taken by the RAC. The documentation that was
provided was couched in “proper terms,” the terms of international law, and the
HBC was asked by British Crown lawyers to provide additional information within
a particular format. After negotiating the matter, the issue remained unresolved
because of a stalemate regarding the allocation of fault: both the British and
Russian government representatives agreed that the RAC had contravened Article
VI of the Convention, but the Russian stance was that HBC financial losses were
due to Ogden's actions since he could have bypassed Russian opposition without
fear of hostile action being taken by employees of the RAC. As this matter
remained without conclusion, the HBC approached the RAC with a proposal that
would end the problem. The result was the Stikine Lease: the RAC would lease a
lisière to the HBC in return for an annual rent, and the British company would
also provide the Russian colony with needed supplies. In this manner, the earlier
goal of the HBC was achieved, that of replacing the American traders as suppliers
of the Russian colonies and thus removing them from the coastal trade since there
was no longer any reason for their sailing along the coast. The HBC also obtained
effective control of a portion of Russian territory. The RAC achieved its goals
as well; it obtained needed supplies on a regular basis and the HBC was made
responsible for the administration of a portion of Russian territory which the
RAC did not have the resources to protect from Indian or non-Indian interests.
In examining this incident one can see how a commercial
altercation with elements affecting the question of international trade was
brought into an international arena, but remained unresolved until the monopolies
concluded the matter on an inter-monopoly level that had territorial
ramifications: the RAC essentially subcontracted the HBC to protect Russian
territory from falling into foreign hands, in effect, the preservation of the
status quo. As Donald C. Davidson states, the agreement “withdrew the region from
any pressures of international rivalries. Its influence on history was
preventative, or negative; for example it allowed the territorial agreement which
has endured as the Alaska-Canada boundary to mature into an accepted unchallenged
fact."84 Thus, the RAC retained possession of the
Stikine territory, received supplies on a regular basis, received annual rent for
the territory leased to the HBC and left the cost and effort of administering the
territory to the HBC.
| 1. |
Records of the Russian-American Company, 1802-1867:
Correspondence of Governors General File. Microcopies of Records in the
National Archives No. 11. 77 rolls. (Henceforth cited as RACR.) These records
are the material that were located in Russian America and acquired by the
United States when it purchased that territory from Russia. [back] |
| 2. |
This collection of documents, which deals
with all aspects of the operations of the Hudson's Bay Company, is now
located in the HBC Archives, Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg,
Manitoba, Canada. [back] |
| 3. |
For more detail regarding the term, see D.K.
Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914 (London: 1976), pp 79-80.
[back] |
| 4. |
If one restricts the examination of this form
of imperialism to a strictly economic analysis, one can apply the term
“imperialism of monopoly” to the study of contemporary multinational corporations,
who, because of their size and resources, can be viewed as possessing de
facto monopolies in various parts of the world. In the present-day context,
one can view these monopolies as exerting various forms of economic, political
and cultural influence (an informal empire through monopoly, if you will).
[back] |
| 5. |
P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly Capitalism
and British Expansion Overseas, I: The Old Colonial System, 1688-1850,”
Economic History Review, Second Series XXXIX, 4 (1986): 501-525
and “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas, II: The New
Imperialism, 1850-1945,” Economic History Review, Second Series
XL, 1 (1987): 1-26 deal with expansion motivated not by industrial capitalism
but by gentlemanly capitalism, which consists of the evolution and interaction
of agricultural, commerical and finacial capitalist enterprise. [back] |
| 6. |
It would be more specific to say that it was
a region populatied by a number of aboriginal groups in which three non-aboriginal
empires came into contact, but this study will deal primarily with the
activities of the latter. For information regarding the aboriginal groups
and the question of Indian-White contact, see Jennifer S. H. Brown, Strangers
in Blood: Fur Trade Families in Indian Country (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 1980); Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict:
Indian-European Realtions in British Columbia, 1774-1890 (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1977); Carol M. Judd and Arthur Ray,
eds., Old Trails and New Directions: Papers of the Third North American
Fur Trade Conference (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980);
Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974); Arthur J. Ray and Donald Freeman, “Give Us Good
Measure”: An Economic Analysis of Relations Between the Indians and the
Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1978); Alvin M. Jpsephy, Jr., “By Fayre and Gentle Meanes: The Hudson's
Bay Company and the American Indian,” The American West ix, 5 (September,
1972), 4-11 and 61-64; the works of E. E. Rich; and Glyndwr Williams, “The
Hudson's Bay Company and the Fur Trade, 1670-1870,” The Beaver,
Vol. 314, No. 2 (Autumn 1983), 4-86. [back] |
| 7. |
George Simpson was born out of wedlock in
about 1786 in the parish of Loch Broom. His father was the eldest son of
the minister of the parish of Avoch, Morayshire and nothing is known of
his mother. He lived with his grandparents and was primarily raised by
his aunt, Mary Simpson. For twelve years he worked as a sugar broker's
clerk in London, but in 1820, he became Governor-in-Chief Locum Tenens
of the Hudson's Bay Company in North America. In 1821 he became Governor
of the Northern Department and was given authority over the Southern Department
in 1826 but did not become governor of both departments officially until
1839. He was knighted in 1841, and died 7 September 1860.[back] |
| 8. |
Hudson's Bay Company Archives (HBCA), A. 6/20,
fol. 164. [back] |
| 9. |
Governor and Committee to Simpson, 27 February
1822, HBCA, A. 6/20, fol. 12; Governor and Committee to John Haldane and
John Dugals Cameron, Chief Factors, Columbia Department, 4 September 1822,
HBCA A. 6/20, fol. 58; and Governor and Committee to Perkins and Company,
Canton, 9 April 1823, HBCA A. 6/20, fol. 108. [back] |
| 10. |
Aemilius Simpson was the son of Alexander
Simpson, a schoolmaster. His mother died and his father married Mary Simpson,
George Simpson's aunt. In April of 1806, aged thirteen, he entered the
Royal Navy, rose to the rank of Lieutenant and retired on half-pay in 1816.
He was recommended to the HBC by George Simpson and was appointed hydrographer
and surveyor as of 1 March 1826. His name was placed on the list of clerks
so he would be eligible for promotion. He arrived at Fort Vancouver, Columbia
River on 2 November 1826, and he became Superintendent of the Marine Department
for the HBC. He was appointed a Chief Trader on 3 November 1830 and died
13 September 1831. For more details, see Hudson's Bay Recodrs Society
Publications, Vol. III, pp. 454-5. [back] |
| 11. |
Governor and Committee to George Simpson,
23 February 1826, HBCA, A. 6/21, fol. 74. [back] |
| 12. |
Chistiakov was Chief Manager of the Russian-American
Company colonies from 14 October 1825 to 1 June 1830. [back] |
| 13. |
Simpson to the Governor and Committee, 31
July 1829, HBCA, A. 12/1, fols. 332-334 and 337. [back] |
| 14. |
Ibid., fols. 333-334. [back] |
| 15. |
Ibid., fol. 337. [back] |
| 16. |
Ibid., 10 August 1824, HBCA, A. 12/1,
fol. 65. [back] |
| 17. |
Peter Skene Ogden was born in Quebec in 1794,
the son of the Hon. Isaac Ogden, a judge of the Admiralty Court. He entered
the service of the North West Company and was a bitter enemy of the HBC.
This prevented his entering the service of the HBC until March 1823 as
a chief clerk. He became a Chief Trader in 1824 and conducted the expeditions
to the Snake River Country from 1824-30. He was made a Chief Factor in
1834 and in 1835 was appointed to the New Caledonia district, where he
stayed until 1844. He returned to the Columbia district after a furlough
in 1844. From 1846 to 1850 he was a member of the board of mangagement
of the Columbia district, and after a furlough for the outfits of 1851
and 1852, he was made a member of the board of management of the Oregon
department. He died in Oregon City 27 September 1854. For further details,
see Hudson's Bay Record Society Publications, Vol. II, p. 238 and
Gloria Griffen Cline, Peter Skene Ogden and the Hudson's Bay Company
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974). [back] |
| 18. |
John McLoughlin was born near Rivière-du-Loup,
Quebec on 19 October 1784. He studied medicine but joined the North West
Company in 1803, becoming a partner in 1814. With the merger of that company
with the HBC he became a chief factor and was placed in charge of the Columbia
District when Governor George Simpson visited the region in 1824-25. The
relationship between the two men became strained over their opinions regarding
the murder of McLoughlin's son at Fort Stikine in 1842. McLoughlin retired
in 1846 and settled in Oregon City, Oregon, where he died 3 September 1857.
W. Kaye Lamb, “John McLoughlin,” The Canadian Encyclopedia (Edmonton:
Hurtig Publishers, 1985). [back] |
| 19. |
McLoughlin to the Governor and Committee,
20 October 1831, in E. E. Rich, ed., The Ltters of John McLoughlin:
>From Fort Vancouver to the Governor and Committee, First Series, 1825-38
(Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1941), p. 232. [back] |
| 20. |
Governor and Committee to McLoughlin, 28 October 1829, HBCA
A. 6/22, fol. 45. [back] |
| 21. |
Captain Simpson's Report of his voyage to Nass, A. Simpson
to McLoughlin, 23 September 1830, The Letters of John McLouglin,
Appendix A, p. 309. [back] |
| 22. |
Ibid., pp 308-9. [back] |
| 23. |
Ibid., p. 311. [back] |
| 24. |
Cline, Peter Skene Ogden and the Hudson's Bay Company,
pp 102-3. [back] |
| 25. |
Burt Brown Barker, ed., Letters of Dr. John McLoughlin:
Written at Fort Vancouver, 1829-1832 (Portland: Oregon Historical Society,
1948), McLoughlin to Aemilius Simpson, 10 April [1831], pp 194-95. [back] |
| 26. |
Ibid., McLoughlin to Ogden, 15 December 1831, pp
237-38. Port Essington, named by Vancouver in 1793, was on the Skeena River. [back] |
| 27. |
Little is known of Ogden's activities in 1832 and 1833 because
the pertinant materials no longer exist. The letters and logbooks that
would illustrate Ogden's movements and actions have been lost, Cline, p.
108. Cline states that Ogden travelled to Sitka and was there on 8 may
1832 on the basis of references made of his in HBC correspondence, Cline,
p. 108 and note 34. Two letters from the Governor and COmmmittee of the
HBC to John McLoughlin, Chief Factor at Fort Vancouver, dated 1 May and
5 June 1833 refer to Ogden and Russian America: “upon the subject of Mr
Chief Trader Ogden's visit to Sitka,” and “For Mr Ogden's correspondence
(No 5) we notice his observation upon the Russian Settlements and his remarks
on the coasting trade in conjunction with the Russians,” HBCA, A. 6/23,
fols. 23 and 29. The problems inherent in the study of Ogden's actions
at this time are obviated when one turns to RAC correspondence between
Vrangel' and the directors of the RAC. These materials are mentioned in
detail below. [back] |
| 28. |
Cline, pp 110-11. [back] |
| 29. |
Governor and Committee to McLouglin, 11 December 1833, HBCA,
A. 6/23, fol. 49. [back] |
| 30. |
Governor and Committee to George Simpson, 5 March 1834,
HBCA, A. 6/23, fol. 70. [back] |
| 31. |
RAC Directors to Count E. F. Kankrin, the Minister of Finance,
27 February 1830 (O.S.), No. 175, RACR, 7:25. This dispatch enclosed Simpson's
letter to the Governor of Russian America and the letter from W. Smith,
the Secretary of the HBC, to the Directors of the RAC. [back] |
| 32. |
Ferdinand Petrovich Vrangel' was born in Pskov
to a family of Baltic-German and Swedish merchants on 29 December 1776
(OS). He entered the navy as a cadet and visited the Northwest Coast as
a Warrant Officer on board the Kamshatcka, which was sent by the
government on a round-the-world expedition to inspect Russian America in
1817-19. Upon his return, he was promoted to Lietenant and given the command
of the Kolyma Expedition (1820-1824) to the northeastern shores of Siberia.
His success in the latter led to his being promoted to Captain-Lieutenant
(Captain of the Second Rank). He visited Russian America again while a
participant in another round-the-world expedition (1825-1827). In 1828
her was promoted to Captain of the First Rank and appointed chief manager
of the Russian-American colonies. He served in this capacity from 1 June
1830 to 29 October 1835. He returned to Russia in 1836, was promoted to
Rear-Admiral and was appointed to the position of Director of the Department
of Ship's Timber in the Naval Mininstry. Disputes with his superiors led
to his leaving the ministry and joining the RAC as an advisor on colonial
and HBC matters for the period 1838-1842. In 1842 he became a member of
the Board of Directors and served as its chairman until 1849, when he retired.
He had been promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral in 1847. In 1854 he returned
to government service as Director of the Hydrographic Department of the
Naval Ministry and was a manager within the ministry during the Crimean
War. This position allowed him to attend meetings of the State Council
and the Council of Ministers. In 1856 he was promoted to General-Adjutant
(an honorary military and court title) and to Admiral. In 1857, as Chief
of Chancery of the Ministry, he became involved in discussions regarding
the possible sale of Russian America to the United States. In 1857 he was
appointed to the State Council but could not take up his duties until 1859
due to illness. In 1864 he retired to his estate, Ruil', in Estalinadsky
Province and died on 25 March 1870 (OS) in Iuruev (Tartu). For more details,
see K. N. Shvarts, “Baron Ferdinand Petrovich Vrangel',” Russkaya Starina,
v (1872), 389-418; and Stephen Marshall Johnson, “Baron Wrangel, and the
Russian-American Company, 1829-1849, Russian-British Conflict and Cooperation
on the Northwest Coast,” unpublished dissertation, University of Manitoba,
1978. [back] |
| 33. |
RAC Directors to Vrangel', 31 March 1831 (OS),
No. 359, 7: 250. [back] |
| 34. |
RAC Directors to Vrangel', 31 March 1833 (OS),
No. 261, RACR, 8: 327-28.[back] |
| 35. |
This dispatch (6 May 1832, Vrangel' to Chief Management,
34:158-161) indicated that Ogden was at Sitka from 26 April to 1 May 1832.
G.G. Cline could not find material in the HBC archives indicating the time
of arrival and departure. The Russian materials, however, indicated when
Ogden arrived and left Sitka, and the topics discussed by Ogden and Vrangel'.
Vrangel' forwarded Ogden's dispatches to the HBC in London by sending them
along with his own to St. Petersburg where the RAC directors sent Ogden's
letters on to London. [back] |
| 36. |
Vrangel' to Directors, 28 April 1824 (OS), RACR, Communications
Sent, 37:174. [back] |
| 37. |
Vrangel' to Chief Management, 6 May 1832, RACR, 34:161. [back] |
| 38. |
Ibid., 37:178. [back] |
| 39. |
Vrangel' to Directors, 6 May 1832 (OS), RACR, Communications
Sent, 34:158-62 [back] |
| 40. |
Ibid., 34:103-06. [back] |
| 41. |
Adolf Karlovich Etholen (1799-1876) was chief manager of
the Russian-American colonies from 25 May 1840 to 9 July 1845. [back] |
| 42. |
He had been ordered by the RAC directors in 1831 to send
a ship to the straits inhabited by the Kolosh to become acquainted with
the navigation and trade in the areas. He was unable to do so because the
RAC did not possess the trade goods in Sitka to enter the trade, and if
the vessel went empty-handed the company would be considered a laughing-stock.
When the goods became available, the vessel was sent. [back] |
| 43. |
Vrangel' to Etholen, 1 March 1833 (OS), RACR, Communications
Sent, 35:12-17. [back] |
| 44. |
Vrangel' to Directors, 1 May 1833 (OS), RACR, Communications
Sent, 35:70-73. [back] |
| 45. |
Vrangel' to Zarembo, 27 August 1833 (OS), RACR, Communications
Sent, 35:221-29. [back] |
| 46. |
Article Two stated that British subjects could not land
where there was a Russian establishment without the permission of its Commandant
or the Governor. The same was true for Russians at British establishments. [back] |
| 47. |
This medal was granted to Kek-khal'-tsel for selling a parcel
of land to the RAC. This land, where his own residence was situated, was
to be the location of the redoubt. See Certificate granting medal to Kek-khal'-tsel,
signed by Baron Vrangel' in New Archangel, 12 May 1834. RACR, 36:281. [back] |
| 48. |
Vrangel' to Zarembo, 12 June 1833, RACR, 35: 149. [back] |
| 49. |
Vrangel' to Directors of the RAC, 10 April 1834, RACR, 36:104. [back] |
| 50. |
Ibid. [back] |
| 51. |
“I consider it my duty to ask the Chief Management
to explain to me the important contradiction in dispatch No. 267 concerning
the sale of strong drinks and firearms to the Kolosh,—about what is mentioned
in one place, 'we cannot act in violation of the Conventions concerning
the sale of firearms and alcoholic drinks to the savages,' and in another
place 'to you is granted full rights to sell not only strong drinks to
the Kolosh, but also firearms and ammunition.' Similarly in dispatch No.
258 it is stated: 'although the Americans and the English long ago violated
the Conventions, we must follow their example and therefore, to the expiration
of the terms of the Conventions, the sale of strong drinks to the savages
cannot be permitted.' But in 1832 I received in dispatch No. 301, the permission
to sell drinks to the Kolosh. How am I to understand all this?” Vrangel'
to RAC Directors, 10 April 1834, RACR, 35:105. [back] |
| 52. |
Vrangel' to Zarembo, 16 May 1834 (OS), RACR,
Communications Sent, 36:301-07. [back] |
| 53. |
Governor and Committee to McLoughlin, 4 December
1833, HBCA, A.6/23, fol.49. [back] |
| 54. |
This vessel sank on its return voyage and
its captain and crew joined the Dryad expedition at Nass. [back] |
| 55. |
McLoughlin to Ogden, 6 May 1834, HBCA, B.223/b/10, fol.7.
[back] |
| 56. |
Robt. Young, Jas Blackie, John Meyers, Archd. Campbell,
Geo. Washington, Jas. Stirlin, John Flinn, James Wilson, John Harmes, Jack
Kanaka, J. Ward, W. Berth, G. Pirey (?), Ridley, Johs Frobisha, Jack Calder,
and John Dunn. For more details, see LOg Book of the Dryad, HBCA,
C.1/281. [back] |
| 57. |
Ogden, Alexander Anderson, a clerk, and sixteen men boarded
the vessel at Fort Vancouver while William Fraser Tolmie, a surgeon, James
Birnie, a clerk, Alexander Duncan, and the officers and crew of the schooner
Vancouver boarded at Nass. Ogden to McLoughlin, 20 December 1834,
HBCA, B.223/c/1, fol. 34. [back] |
| 58. |
| Questions
name of Vessel:
name of Master:
under what Flag:
her burthen:
number of men:
number of guns:
object in coming here: |
Answers
Brig Dryad
Charles Kipling
British
203 tons
4 officers and 26 men
6 guns
Commerce |
| Declaration of Charles Kipling, 17 November 1836, HBCA, C./742, fol.
13. [back] |
|
| 59. |
William Fraser Tolmie was born in Inverness, Scotland, on
3 February 1812. He studied medicine at Glasgow University and graduated
with the degree of M.D. in 1832. On 12 September of the same year he entered
the service of the HBC as physician and surgeon. He arrived at Fort George,
at the mouth of the Columbia River, on 1 May 1833. From 30 May to 12 December
he was at Nisqually and from 23 December 1833 to May 1834 he was at Fort
McLoughlin. He joined Ogden's expedition to the Stikine and it sailed from
Fort McLouglin on the Dryad on 30 May. After spending some time
at Fort Simpson, he returned to Fort McLoughlin on 3 November. He was stationed
at Fort Vancouver from 1836 to 1841, whe he returned to Great Britain for
a visit. Upon his return in 1843, he was made superintendent of the Nisqually
farms of the Puget Sound Agricultural Company (PSAC) and retained this
position until 1859. He then moved to Victoria, took over the management
of the RSAC farms on Vancouver Island and become one of the three members
of the Board of Management of the HBC. He retired in 1870 and died on 8
December 1866. For more details of his life see S. F. Tolmie, “My Father:
William Fraser Tolmie,” British Columbia Quarterly, i, 4 (October
1937): 227-240. [back] |
| 60. |
Recollections of George B. Roberts, Bancroft Library, P-A83,
p. 9. I thank the Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California, for allowing
me to cite these materials from its collections. [back] |
| 61. |
See William Fraser Tolmie, The Journals of William Fraser
Tolmie, Physician and Fur Trader (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1963),
pp. 283-286 and Ogden's Report of transactions at Stikine 1834, The
Letters of John McLoughlin, Appendix A, pp. 317-322. [back] |
| 62. |
Article XI states the following: “In every case of complaint
on account of an infraction of the ARticles of the present Convention,
the civil and military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, without
previously acting or taking any forcible measures, shall make an exact
and circumstancial report of the matter to their respective Courts, who
engage to settle the same, in a friendly manner, and according to the principles
of justice.” Convention between Great Britain and Russia, signed at St.
Petersburg, 16/28 February 1825, Boundary between the Dominion of Canada
and the Territory of Alaska, Argument presented on the part of the Government
of His Britannic Majesty (London: Printed at the Foreign Office, 1903),
p. 39. [back] |
| 63. |
Etholen to Zarembo, 13/25 June 1834, pp. 426-429. [back] |
| 64. |
The Letters of John McLoughlin, p. 319. [back] |
| 65. |
Tolmie, p. 285. [back] |
| 66. |
For a more detailed account of the voyage of the Dryad,
see Dryad — Ship's Log, HBCA, C.1/281, fols. 178-89 and C.1/282,
fols. 20-22. [back] |
| 67. |
Tolmie, p. 286. [back] |
| 68. |
The number of guns varies: Ogden's Report of transactions
at Stikine 1834 in The Letters of John McLoughlin, p. 318, and the
Times, 3 November 1835 state there were fourteen while G. G. Cline,
p. 114 and Tolmie, p. 284, state there were sixteen, twelve cannon and
four swivel guns. [back] |
| 69. |
Vrangel' to Ogden, 19 September/1 October 1834, F.29/2,
fols. 37-39. [back] |
| 70. |
For a more complete account see “McLoughlin's Statment of
the Expenses Incurred in the 'Dryad' Incident of 1834,” British Columbia
Historical Quarterly x, (1946), pp. 291-97. [back] |
| 71. |
John Henry Pelly was born 31 March 1777 at Upton, Essex.
He became a director of the HBC in 1806, Deputy Governor in 1812 and Governor
in 1822. He retained the latter position until his death. In 1838 Pelly,
accompanied by George Simpson, went to Russia to meet with the Directors
of the RAC to resolve the Dryad Affair. He was a director of the Bank of
England, from 1939-41 he was Deputy Governor and from 1841-2 he was Governor.
He was knighted on 6 July 1840. He died on 13 August 1852. For more details
see Reginald Saw, “Sir John H. Pelly, Bart.,” British Columbia Historical
Quarterly, xiii, 1 (January 1949), pp. 23-32, and Sir Leslie Stephen
and Sir Sidney Lee, eds., The Dictionary of National Biography (London:
Oxford University Press, 1917), vol. xv, p. 720.[back] |
| 72. |
Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston, was born on
20 October 1784 at Broadlands, the family estate, Hampshire. He was junior
lord of the Admiralty 1807-09 and secretary at war from 1809-28. He was
secretary of state for foreign affairs from 22 November 1830 to 1841, except
for the period 17 November 1834 to 17 April 1835, and from 1846 to 1851.
In the Aberdeen Coalition of 1852-1855, Palmerston was home secretary.
He was prime minister from 1855-58 and 1859-65. He died at Brocket Hall,
Hertfordshire, 18 October 1865. For more details, see The Dictionary
of National Biography, vol. xi, pp. 463-66. [back] |
| 73. |
John George Lambton, first Earl of Durham was born in London
on 12 April 1792. He represented the county of Durham in the House of Commons
as a Whig from 1813 to 1828, when he was created Baron Durham. He was Lord
Privy Seal in the administration of Lord Grey, his father-in-law, and was
one of the persons who drew up the Reform Bill. He resigned in 1833, the
year he was made an earl, and from 1835 to 1837 he was ambassador extraordinary
to St. Petersburg. In 1838 he was appointed governor-general of Canada
but he returned to England five months later because the House of Lords
voted against the approval of some of his acts. He died at Cowes on 28
July 1840. For more details, see The Dictionary of National Biography,
vol. xi, pp. 463-466. [back] |
| 74. |
Palmerston to Durham, 13 November 1835, Palmerston Papers,
B.M., ADD.MSS 48534, fol. 18. [back] |
| 75. |
Department of Manufacture and Inland Trade to the Directors
of the RAC, 31 December (O.S.), No. 4174, RACR, Communications Received,
10:51. [back] |
| 76. |
Recollections, p.9. [back] |
| 77. |
See Ogden's Report of Transactions at Stikine
1834, Letters of John McLoughlin, Appendix A, pp. 317-322. [back] |
| 78. |
Report of Governor J. H. Pelly, 1838, HBCA,
F.29/2, fol. 141. [back] |
| 79. |
This renewal would have given to further American
competition with the RAC for Indian furs, something the latter did not
want. In 1838 the American Minister in St. Petersburg, George M. Dallas,
was informed by the Russian Government that the treaty would not be renewed.
One of the three competitors for the control of the Pacific Northwest Coast
was thus removed. [back] |
| 80. |
Nesselrode to Kankrin, 9 December 1838 (O.S.)
Proceedings of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal (PABT), Appendix to
the Case of the United States, ii, pp. 307-08. [back] |
| 81. |
For a more detailed listing of the conditions
of the lease see Appendix to the Case of His Majesty's Government, Alaska
Boundary Tribunal, i, pp. 150-52. [back] |
| 82. |
The lawyers wanted each amount to be formally
certified by the agents on the spot, listing by whom disbursements were
made and including supporting vouchers. The statements were lacking in
that no mention was made of to what extent the wages of the men in the
expedition became a total loss to the company; deductions were to be made
from the claims for the other work done by these persons in the period
under discussion and for other uses the Dryad may have been put
to. J. Backhouse to J.H. Pelly, 20 July 1836, HBCA, A.13/1, fols. 324-25.[back] |
| 83. |
These reasons are presented in Zapiski
o vozobnovlenii kontrakt s Gydzonbaiskoyu Kompanieyu, St. Petersburg,
1848, pp. 1-3.[back] |
| 84. |
Donald C. Davidson, “Relations of the Hudson's
Bay Company with the Russian American Company on the Northwest Coast, 1829-1867,"
British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 5, 1(1941), p. 51. [back]
|
|
